593 was with his brother and not his brother's sons. When the father persisted with his intention to embarrass his nephews, his sons, as a last alternative, threatened to leave him. In the face of this threat, the father capitulated.

The rights and duties of the father-son relationship, although they do not change in sentiment, will change in content during the lifetime of the father. The main change [421] in content will be a reflection of a change in property re- 593 lations. The Bedouin believe that this is the way it ought 579 to be; they say that

> A son must respect and obey his father. The son must do anything that he can to help and please his father. When the son grows up and begins to earn money, he must contribute generously to his father. A son pleases his father by giving him money and helping him to be comfortable.

593 In boyhood and manhood, the father has disposal over his son's 596 labor. As long as a son lives in his father's naja' this is [464] so. One son, who worked for an American oil company in the desert, regularly turned over his pay check to his father. It is the father who decides where the son will live, and, whether or not he will have his own domicile away from the main naja'. When the son marries and brings his wife to the [591] naja', he will usually set up his tent next to his father's tent. The tent is given to the boy by his father. During 593 the son's growing-up period, he will be given, as gifts on 431 various occasions, a sheep or a number of sheep which will be kept with the father's flock.

*613 582 'Ailit Lazumi, the other lineage, along with 'Ailit Ma'fas, considered to be the most powerful in al-Qasr. In the fourth [423] case, Abd al-Latif's marriage into 'Ailit Dawlat, this individual owns an olive orchard in Dawlat territory, adjacent to that of Ma'fas, which he purchased from a member of his wife's lineage before their marriage. In every case, with *613 582 one exception, marriage ties are intimately related to property •421 relations, cognation with local contiguity. The two groups become politically entwined, and property relations become a basis for authority relations.

*613 All things considered, complementary filiation is as important in Bedouin society as it is in other societies: "The bilateral family is the focal element in the web of [533] kinship" (Fortes 1953:33). As one Bedouin wedding song puts it: "The bride is the flower of the stem," the stem here symbolizing her tertiary group.

583 The amount of brideprice which a man is expected to 554 pay will depend upon his status as an "outsider" or an "insider," 556 and his position on the prestige scale which is figured largely in terms of wealth. A man adds to his prestige and reputation when he pays beyond the "going price" to obtain a bride for his son. On the other hand, if a man is an "outsider," he is expected to pay well beyond the normal brideprice for the privilege of marrying into the family, and he receives no additional prestige unless he goes even higher than what is

675 culprit, and are no longer responsible for his acts." The
681 barawwa is not only the imposition of a most severe sanction
675 by the group, but it is also the withdrawal of all positive
681 sanctions which would apply to an individual as a member of
571 the group. The withdrawal of sanctions means the withdrawal of the right of reciprocity; consequently, the banished no longer comes under the rule of succession, and he has no rights over either persons or things. The banished may claim [421] no property of the property of the group other than that which he takes with him, and he may claim no women from the group.
675 The barawwa, naturally enough, is uncommon in al-Qasr. The
681 last occurred in 1957, the declaration of which is reproduced below.

DECLARATION OF BARAWWA

Law Office of Abd al-Rahman
Marsa Matruh

50 milleme tax stamp

On this date the following came: Kuraim Juhami of the 'Aishaibat on behalf of himself and his paternal uncle, and their 'umda, the first party. And there also came Sa'ad Uthman on behalf of himself and his children, the second party. The reason for the coming together of these two parties is in order to ask the barawwa from each other. Since they have all agreed by their own will without any force or ill feeling that the two parties shall not be responsible for each other's actions, it is a valid agreement that can never be rejected. No one from either of the parties is responsible to the other in supporting oaths, in paying for wounds, or in paying blood-revenge (diya), and no one from either party involved in barawwa will take girls from the other. This barawwa became a dividing line between the two parties, and if later there appears a fraternity paper, the barawwa will be cancelled and be to no avail. This paper is signed

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

sections of a tribe may be opposed to one another they regard themselves as an undivided group in opposition to neighbouring tribes, and are so regarded by their neighbours. Thus a Qalbati is only a Qalbati in Hasa country. In 'Abaidat or Bara'asa country he is a Hasi. Likewise a Darsi or an 'Abidi in contrast to members of other tribes regards the whole of the Darsa or the 'Abid as his people, his tribal brothers.

Each tribe in this commonly accepted sense has its *watan*, its homeland, its soil, its arable, its pastures, and its wells; and each has its camel-brand which is also carved on the tomb-stones of its dead. The tribal lands are vested in the tribe, which has residual rights in them. They cannot, therefore, be alienated to other tribes without the consent of the whole tribe. A tribe is conceived of as a huge family descended from a common ancestor, from whom the tribe generally takes its name. Hence its segments can be figured either as a series of political sections or as genealogical branches of a clan.

A tribe is divided into several, generally two or three, primary divisions, or sub-tribes, which own well-defined portions of the tribal territory, in most cases running in strips unbroken by intrusive elements. These primary divisions are of the same pattern as the tribe of which they form part. Each division has its *watan*, which its members own and defend collectively. They believe that they are descended from a common ancestor, who is generally a son of the ancestor of the tribe. Primary tribal divisions split into secondary divisions, and secondary divisions into tertiary divisions, and so on. Each of the smaller divisions is a replica of the larger ones and has the same preferential and exclusive rights in its lands, an encroachment on which by another division will lead to fighting. Each has within the tribal brand its special lineage markings. The members of each division also consider that they are descended from a common ancestor who, in his turn, is descended from the ancestor of the larger division of which they form a section. The further the sub-division the more the resultant groups take on the complexion of kinship aggregates, rather than of political aggregates.

These kinship aggregates or extended family groups are the basic units of tribal life. They are called *biyut* (sing. *bait*). The tribe may be the residual owner of land and water but the *biyut* are the owners in use. Their members live in the same

Cases

593 613 tegral part of "the one body"; events which affect a man in this context lie outside a father's field of jurisdiction. The political authority vested in a corporation acts to circumscribe the authority of persons in other fields.

Other rights stem from political membership. As a person with a defined position in a lineage corporation, a man has the right to use the natural resources of its territory. His father, although he instructs his son where to plough and when to water the animals, cannot deny him access to wells, pastures and ploughland. Economically, a son is independent to this extent, although his ability to exploit his right to the natural resources is restricted by his father's control of animals. Ultimately, however, this restriction cannot amount to stultification, because a man has the right to 613 422 735 demand food. In practice, a poor man staves off hunger with donations from this or that individual, and superficially it appears that he is dependent on the personal charity of his fellowmen. This is not so, for what is implicit is that the parcels of wealth controlled by individuals are the possessions of the corporation. It is not accidental that poor people do not go hungry. During my entire stay among the Bedouin I never saw one of them beg or [556] suffer hunger, however marginal the diet of many. Clearly, those with a surplus can and do use it for personal advantage, but the extent to which they can do so is circumscribed by the legal claims which members of a corporation have on the parcels of moveable property held by each of them.

613 421 428 Control over the wealth, whether it be animals or the procreative functions of women, rests, in the final analysis, in a corporation. Inheritance laws specify that women are not legal heirs,[8] and that all male children are equal heirs. Women do, in fact, come to control property, and it is rare that [562] wealth is equally divided among male heirs. The precise details of inherit- [593] ance may partly be decided by a father, but he is limited in his actions. Most of the time inheritance disputes are not of the kind which require action by the corporate group; a case which occured while I was resident with the Bedouin did, however, invoke immediate action. A man, who had left the desert to live in a village on the plateau, had only one daughter. He made it known that he intended to will his entire property to his daughter. When the news was brought to the camps of his fellow agnates, there was great consternation, because, as became clear in their lengthy discussions, the threat now existed that a substantial parcel of property would be removed from the group, a threat made real by the proposed marriage of the daughter [584] to a man of another tribe. The court would have to recognise the daughter's right to some of the property, and the members of the group reluctantly had to concede that there was little they could do about this, but they had one [593] action left to them — they decided that her nearest agnate should demand [584] her in marriage. Usually, the choice of husband for a daughter is a decision

[771] [795] [671] [8] The Bedouin are Sunni Muslims, and, as Samusi, belong to the Maliki school in legal matters. According to court law, women are heirs. However, actual Bedouin practice is contrary to law. For, if women were permitted to inherit, since many marry outside the corporation into which they were born, they could alienate its resources.

6: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1965 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

her father takes, but in certain critical situations he can be relieved of choice if the interests of the group as a whole are at stake.

Political authority is the preserve of a corporation, and its exercise leads to invasion of a man's authority in the field of domestic relations. This does not mean, however, that discrete areas of authority do not remain with the father. In the tent his authority over his son is so overwhelming as to keep the son in almost complete subordination. The son is referred to as a slave, and in daily life he has to behave as one. He must obey every command, for, were he to rebel, he would find little or no support among his agnates, whatever the extent of the provocation. Retreat from his father is hardly an alternative, since, while his father is alive, he has no animals of his own, and to leave camp would only mean that he would have to move outside his group to seek employment elsewhere as a shepherd. If he did this he would forfeit status, and almost certainly cut himself off from property which would fall to him after his father's death. A man who "denies" his father looses too many privileges for the practice to become widespread.

Caught in this dilemma, a son's predicament is worsened by the fact that he cannot initiate marriage negotiations — to be able to do so requires some animals to offer a girl's father. Through his mother's brother he has the means of bringing pressure to bear on his father, but the latter can resist for years. Finally, a marriage is arranged for him. It is difficult to convey the yearning of young Bedouin for marriage. They discuss it among themselves *ad nauseam*. For the most part their talk is about the sexual aspect of marriage. Premarital sex relations are strictly controlled, and the movements of each young girl are carefully guarded because, if on the day of her marriage the test shows that she is not a virgin, she not only brings disgrace to her family, but the marriage may be revoked and her worth as a bride for another man seriously diminished. Nevertheless premarital relations do occur, if not between youths and maidens to any extent, between young men and married women.

The question still remains: why is marriage the occasion of such ebullient celebration? The formal authority a father exercises over his son changes little on marriage. Economically the son is still harnessed to the father. The latter still shouts his orders at him, and obedience remains unaltered. Any sign of an independent view on a matter is met with a gruff rebuff. If the marriage turns out to be disagreeable to the father, he has the authority — if not always the power — to break it. Marriage does not mean a change in the general mode of behaviour between the two; the legal relations remain unaltered, albeit modified in practice, as the married son matures in age. But marriage does mean the acquisition of rights and status previously denied a son. Henceforward, he has a domain of his own. This is high drama, indeed, for although every effort is made to give substance to the expressed view that "nothing has happened," for the first time in his life the son has seized publicly, amid the jubilations of his fellows, a status which hitherto was the possession of the father.